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 The Effect of Rental Rates on the Extension of  
 Conservation Reserve Program Contracts 
 
 Abstract 
This paper presents a model for estimating the change in conservation reserve program (CRP) 
contract extensions as a function of the change in rental rates.  The majority of the CRP contracts 
on approximately 36 million acres of enrolled land are expiring within the next two years, with the 
result that re-enrollment decisions by farmers and the federal government will have high budgetary 
implications.  In a modification of the traditional dichotomous choice method for estimating 
random utility models in consumer surveys, we develop an ordered response referendum model 
that allows us to explicitly model the range in rental rates over which the representative farmer 
may be ambivalent to renewing the CRP contract.  We use the empirical results from the ordered 
response model to estimate acreage re-enrollment as a function of the rental rate. 
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I. Introduction 
Under the voluntary Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the United States Department of 
Agriculture has (USDA) established contracts with farmers to retire highly erodible or 
environmentally sensitive cropland from agricultural production.  Over the life of a typical ten 
CRP contract, cropland is converted to grass, trees, wildlife cover, or other conservation uses.  
This shift in land use can provide society with numerous environmental benefits including 
improvement of surface water quality, creation of wildlife habitat, preservation of soil 
productivity, protection of groundwater quality, and reduction of offsite wind erosion damages 
(Ribaudo et. al., 1990).  The program also assists farmers by providing them with a dependable 
source of income from their retired land and reduces commodity surpluses (Young and Osborn, 
1990).  During 1986-1992, 36.4 million acres of cropland were enrolled in the CRP at an average 
annual government rent of $50 per acre (Osborn, et al., 1992).  The bulk of this land will be 
coming out of contract in 1996 and 1997, thereby raising concerns that a large percentage of CRP 
land may return to crop production, especially if prices and/or commodity programs are favorable.  
 
For the 33.9 million of these acres that were enrolled prior to November, 1990, the CRP contract 
acceptance process was noncompetitive in nature (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1989)i and a 
significant number of CRP participants are likely receiving rental payments well in excess of what 
their cropland would rent for on the cash rental market.  This paper investigates how CRP 
participants may react to changes in existing rental rates, and how this change could affect the 
number of CRP acres on which contracts are renewed.  To do so, we develop a supply function 
that models total acreage enrolled as a function of the CRP rental payment and other explanatory 
variables.  We use a referendum contingent behavior analysis of current CRP contract holders 
across the nation to develop this function.  In a modification of the traditional survey approach, 
the referendum approach used here explicitly accounts for farmers who may be ambivalent 
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between re-enrolling and leaving the program. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the theoretical framework for addressing 
this issue, Section III discusses the data set,  Section IV presents the econometric results, and 
Section V discusses the potential levels of re-enrollment of CRP acres and the associated 
government costs of these renewals.  
  
II.  Theoretical Framework for the Farmer's Decision to Re-enroll 
The farmer's decision to re-enroll in the CRP can be modelled using the random utility model 
(RUM) approach.  From the utility theoretic standpoint, a farmer is willing to extend his CRP 
contract for an additional ten years if the farmer's utility with the extension is greater than or equal 
his utility per acre without the extension, i.e., if U(0,y;x) ≤ U(1,y + RP;x), where 0 is the state 
without the CRP contract; 1 is the state with the CRP contract extension; y is farmer i's income; 
and x is a vector of other attributes of the farmer that may affect the decision to extend the contract.  
RP is the CRP rental payment per acre.  RP implicitly includes any change in income the farmer 
believes will be associated with enrolling the land in CRP versus employing the land in other uses.  
The farmer's utility function U(i,y;s) is unknown due to components of it that are unobservable to 
the researcher, and thus, can be considered a random variable from the researcher's standpoint.  
The observable portion is V(i,y;x), the mean of the random variable U.  With the addition of an 
error εi, where εi is an independently and identically distributed random variable with zero mean, 
the farmer's decision to extend the contract can be re-expressed as  
 
[1] V(0,y;x) + ε0 ≤ V(1,y + RP;x) + ε1.   
 
If V(i,y;x) = γi + αy, where α > 0, for i = 0,1, then the farmer is willing to extend the contract if γ0 
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+ αy + ε0 ≤ γ1 + α(y+RP) + ε1. 
 
The decision to extend the contract can be expressed in a probability framework as Pr{RPR ≥ 
$RP} = Pr{V0 + ε0 ≤ V1 + ε1} = Pr{ε0 - ε1 ≤ V1 - V0}, where RPR is the farmer's reservation price 
to extend the contract, V1 - V0 = γ + αRP, and where γ =γ1 - γ0.   Since V1 - V0 = γ + αRP is 
generated directly from the utility model given above, it is compatible with the theory of utility 
maximization.  Hanemann (1984; 1989) describes how to calculate the mean and median 
minimum rental payments the farmers are willing to accept for the extension.  For this paper, the 
mean, or median value is of secondary importance to estimating the probability of extension of the 
contract.  The probabilities of extension will be converted into a schedule of CRP acres enrolled 
as a function of the rental payment.    
 
Extension of the Theoretical Model to Allow for Farmer Indifference 
Typically, the RUM discussed above is modelled in a dichotomous framework that does not allow 
for a "don't know" response: either the respondent selects "yes" to accepting the payment 
(assuming WTA) if the individual's utility in the new state is greater than or equal that in the base 
state or the respondent selects "no" to accepting the payment if the individual's utility in the new 
state is less than that in the base state.  This model conforms to the neoclassical assumption that 
the decision-maker can unambiguously rank options.  However, in reality, individuals do not 
always have a well-defined utility function and hence, may be ambivalent in the ranking of some 
bundles of goods.  Akerlof and Dickens (1982) conducted the earliest economic research on 
incorporating ambivalence in the decision-making process.  Heiner (1983) discusses how 
uncertainty affects optimization of the utility function. Believing that respondents should not be 
forced into a choice between only "yes" or "no", the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's Blue Ribbon Panel on the use of CVM (Department of Commerce, 1993) 
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recommended that survey respondents be given the option to give an indecisive response to a 
referendum question. 
 
The possibility of ambivalence or uncertainty in the farmer's decision to accept the offer of 
renewing the CRP contract can be depicted in Figure 1 in a manner similar to Opaluch and 
Segerson (1989).ii  The 45 degree line is placed in the graph to depict choices that do not represent 
a change in total acreage.  However, for this discussion, we assume that the farmer can purchase 
or sell land.   Assume the farmer is currently at point A in his allocation of land between CRP 
acres and non-CRP acres.  As it provides more of both types of acreage, any bundle in area I is 
strictly superior to bundle A.  As it provides less of both types of acreage, any bundle in area II is 
strictly inferior to bundle A.  As bundles in area III gives up little CRP acreage in exchange for 
much more non-CRP acreage and bundles in area IV gives up little non-CRP acreage in exchange 
for much more CRP acreage.  Hence, the farmer prefers bundles in areas III and IV to bundle A.  
However, bundles in areas V and VI are not preferred to bundle A as they tend to represent a 
relatively high loss in one type of acreage with little gain in the other.  This then leaves areas VII 
and VIII, which contain bundles for which this farmer is ambivalent to with respect to bundle A.  
In this graph, the farmer is indifferent between bundle B, which represents nonrenewal of the CRP 
contract with no change in the total land base, and the current allocation A, but prefers both these 
bundles to allocation C.  The goal of this paper is to model the farmer's minimum WTA to stay at 
bundle A, with bundle B as the alternative.  Putting this theoretical model aside, some ambiguity 
in the farmer's decision to renew the CRP contract is not unexpected because while the CRP 
income per acre is certain, the income on non-CRP land is not. 
 
If there is a range of rental prices over which the farmer is indifferent to extending the contract, 
then forcing the farmers to make a definitive "yes" or "no" choice over this range of prices could 
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bias the results, especially if there is a particular tendency for the indifferent farmers to chose "no" 
over "yes" (or the other way around) when forced to make a "yes" or "no" decision.  If this 
potential for bias is present, then, in addition to asking the farmer to choose or not choose to extend 
the contract, the farmer should be allowed to choose a third option of being indifferent.  Since a 
farmer will not be willing to extend the contract for a low price, may be indifferent at a higher 
price, and has some reservation price above which the farmer will definitely extend the contract, 
these three choices can be ranked ordinally as "no", "don't know", and "yes", which will take on the 
values 0, 1, and 2, respectively.  As explained in more detail in footnote 3, note that "don't know" 
is defined in this paper only for respondents who understand the nature of the good being offered, 
as opposed to a "don't know" response stemming from the respondent not understanding the CVM 
question.      
 
Ordered probit is the appropriate model to analyze multinomial-choice variables that are ordinally 
ranked (Greene, 1990; Zavoina and McElvey, 1975).  Since the basic multinomial-choice model 
does not consider the ordinal ranking of the discrete outcomes, an application of this model would 
not make full use of the information contained in this data set.  Ordinary regression analysis of 
this data is also inappropriate since it would presume that 0,1, and 2 are cardinally ranked, and 
thus, would infer too much information from the data.  The ordered probit model for multiple 
outcomes in the referendum format can be specified as before as: 
 
(2)  ΔV* = γ + αRP + ε 
where ΔV* is the unobserved utility difference.  What is observed are the responses  
 y = 0  if μ-1 ≤ ΔV*  ≤ μ0, 
 y = 1  if μ0 ≤ ΔV* ≤ μ1, 
 y = 2  if μ1 ≤ ΔV* ≤ μ2.  
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subjective.  Since μ0 = 0, note that the width of the dollar indifference range is proportional to μ1. 
If a constant is to be included in the regression, then one of the μ's is not identified.  In this case, 
μ0 is normalized to 0 (Greene, 1992). By convention, μ-1 and μ2 (equal to μJ in the three choice 
case) are set equal to -∞ and ∞, respectively.  Hence, with three outcomes, the only μ that needs to 
be estimated is μ1.  The log of the likelihood function for the ordered response model (Greene, 
1990) with three outcomes is 
(3) lnL(α,γ) = ∑i Dy
i
=0×lnφ[-ΔVi] + Dy
i
=1×lnφ[μ1-ΔVi]-φ[-ΔVi] + Dy
i
=2×ln1-φ[μ-ΔVi]  
 
where Dyi equals 1 if yi = j, j = 1,2,3, and zero otherwise.  The dependent variable, yi = 0 for a "no" 
response, 1 for a "don't know", and 2 for a "yes" response to the survey questions. 
 
The determination of the median and median benefits values with the ordered model is somewhat 
ambiguous when compared to the dichotomous choice model.  In the dichotomous probit model, 
the median value can be found where Prob[RPR ≤ $RP] = Prob[No] = F[-ΔV] = 1 - prob[Yes] = 
50%.  However, because the ordered model has more than two choices, Prob[No] is not equal to 1 
- Prob[Yes] (i.e., Prob[Yes] + Prob[No] + Prob[Indifferent] = 100%).  Figure 2 provides a 
graphical depiction of the farmer response function CDFs under the assumption that the 
distributions are symmetric.  In this figure, the dollar value corresponding to a 50 percent of a 
"no" response occurs at point a and the dollar value corresponding to the 50 percent probability of 
a "yes" response occurs at point b.  The band over which the representative farmer is indifferent 
runs from point a to point b.  With a nonzero probability of an indifferent response, the point 
where the probability of a "yes" is equal to the probability of a "no" occurs at a probability less than 
50% (point c).  Prob[No] = 50% is found where μ0 = ΔV, and Prob[yes] = 50% is found where μ1 
- ΔV = 0.  Hence, either choice would produce a legitimate median and the choice would be 
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 Data Sources and Description 
ervation Society (SWCS), along with the assistance of the 
cted a 
ly 
CS.  
ccording to USDA, through the 12th signup period, a total of 375,000 contracts covering 36.4 
 
y 
, 
get 
ontract Extension Questions 
 were elicited for their willingness to extend their CRP contracts 
   
III.
In late 1993, the Soil and Water Cons
United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Economic Research Service, Soil 
Conservation Service, Forest Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency condu
national survey of CRP participants.  Questionnaires were mailed to more than 17,000 random
chosen individuals representing 5 percent of CRP contract-holders.  Ultimately, 68 percent 
(11,578) of the questionnaires in useable form were completed by farmers and returned to SW
The reliability of the responses should be enhanced by the fact that for many of the sampled 
contract holders, expiration dates were close to the survey date.   
 
A
million acres were enrolled in the CRP.  However, the 2.5 million acres enrolled in signups 10-12
after passage of the 1990 Farm Act will not begin to expire until the year 2000.  To increase the 
reliability of the responses, sample selection was limited to the 333,000 contracts enrolled in 
signups 1-9.  A random sample of 5-percent, or 17,300, of these contracts were chosen by 
USDA's Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS).  Review of the surve
questionnaire was conducted by an ad hoc committee of individuals from government, the 
nonprofit sector, and academia.  The survey was conducted, to the extent resources allowed
according to  common mail survey techniques (Dillman, 1978).  The survey was mailed in 
September, 1993.  A month later, follow-up questionaires were sent to nonrespondents.  Bud
constraints prevented a second follow-up mailing. 
 
C
The current CRP contract holders
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to a 
narios 
ven though the above questions are framed in the WTA format, and hence, are not income 
ite 
at the 
ced 
or estimation, using USDA records of the current rental payment made to the each of the 
under two scenarios.  In the scenario 1, they were asked "Would you accept [X] percent of your 
current annual CRP rental payment per acre to extend your CRP contract for an additional 10 years
if the contract extension did not allow haying or grazing?"  This is the base scenario as haying or 
grazing is not currently allowed on CRP land.  In the scenario 2, they were asked "Would you 
accept [Y] percent of your current annual CRP rental payment per acre to extend your CRP 
contract for an additional 10 years if the contract did allow haying and/or grazing according 
management plan that prevents overgrazing and does not allow haying until mid-July to protect 
soil, water, and wildlife resources?"  In either scenario, the farmer is asked to respond by 
checking off either "no", "don't know", or "yes".iii  The percentage values posted in the sce
were varied across the respondents and assigned randomly, and since the second scenario allows 
the farmer more management flexibility, the value posted in the second scenario is set lower than 
that in the first scenario.iv   
 
E
constrained, we believe that they may be more incentive compatible than many WTP survey 
questions.  Some level of incentive compatibility is likely as many of the respondents may qu
rationally believe that their responses may influence the setting of CRP-related policies.  In fact, 
the survey's introduction states that the survey results (short of names and addresses of the 
respondents) will be shared with Congress and the USDA.  If contract-holders do believe th
results may influence policy, then exaggerating their WTA may suggest to Congress that the 
program is too expensive and increase the probability that the program will be dropped or redu
in magnitude.  Under-reporting WTA may lead to a re-evaluation of current payments with the 
result that the farmer may be offered payments lower than his reservation price.   
 
F
 
 
9
range 
n 
or the regressions, additional explanatory variables besides the offered rental payment thought to 
able 1 presents the mean and standard deviations for the continuous explanatory variables for the 
el of 
en 
able 2 presents the proportion of "no", "don't know", and "yes" responses for each offered bid.  
respondents, the percent value in the questions are converted to dollar values.v  Due to the 
and variation in CRP rental payments, it was more convenient to pose the survey question in the 
form of a percentage increase of reduction in the current rental payment than as dollar values.  
Statistical significance of the bid changed little regardless of whether the bid was in percent or i
dollar terms.  
 
F
be likely determinants of the contract holder's decision to extend were chosen from both the SWCS 
survey and USDA records (CRP contract data, Consolidated Farm Services Agency, USDA).  
The appendix contains the description of the explanatory variables and their sources. 
 
T
observations used in regressions.  Excluding all observations with at least one missing value for 
the variables included in the regressions, the sample sizes are 8,125 and 8,027 for the no 
haying/grazing scenario and the haying/grazing allowed scenarios, respectively.  The lev
correlation between any two variables is no more than 0.28.  Note that, except for the RPAY 
variable, which is lower by design in the second scenario,  there is very little difference betwe
the variable statistics for the two scenarios. 
 
T
For the no haying/grazing option, there seems to be little systematic change in proportion of "don't 
knows" as the rental offer increases.  However, the two lowest "don't know" percentages do occur 
around the upper end of the rental offers.  As a simple test for a relationship between the bid value 
and the probability of receiving a "don't know" response to that bid value, a linear regression of the 
percentage of "don't know" responses to each offered cost share percentage on a constant and the 
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't 
 
 
on of 
. Results 
cenarios, the ordered probit log-likelihood function in Equation 5 was maximized 
 
 
he signs of the coefficients in Table 3 are generally as expected. The coefficient on the rental 
vector of rental offers (denominated as X percent of current rent)  yielded an R2 of 0.20 and  
t-ratio of -1.23 on the rental offer.  For the haying/grazing allowed option, the percent of "don
knows" displayed a more systematic decrease with increases in the rental offers.  In this case, the
linear regression of the percent of "don't know" responses to each bid regressed on a constant and 
the vector of rental offers yielded an R2 of 0.79 and  negative coefficient on the rental offer, which 
has a t-ratio of -4.6.  These results suggests that, for the second scenario, farmer indecision about 
accepting the rental offer has a significant tendency to fall as the rental offer increases.  Note too 
that the second scenario's "don't know" proportions are higher at each bid offer than those for the 
first option.  This increase in uncertainty for the second scenario over the first is not surprising 
considering that haying and/or grazing on the CRP land is not currently permissible.  Hence, for
the second scenario, the farmer must give more thought to the implications of a lower CRP 
payment but more management control than in the first scenario, which is simply a continuati
their current rental agreements. 
 
IV
For the two s
using the both the canned ordered probit routine in Limdep (Greene, 1992) and with a maximum
likelihood program written by the authors using Gauss.  The results were the same using either 
program.  Table 3 presents the regression results.  Also presented in the table are univariate 
probit results for the data sets with all "don't know" responses thrown out.  Since we were not
allowed to split the survey into two groups, with one group receiving  dichotomous choice 
versions of the scenarios, the data sets with the "don't knows" deleted are the closest 
approximation possible to a dichotomous choice version possible.   
 
T
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an for 
 
s not 
e 
 Table 3, for both scenarios, μ1 is positive and significant.  Solving μ0 = 0 = ΔV* = γ + αRPR 
n 
r 
 this 
payment (RPAY) is positive and strongly significant. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on 
LSTOCK is larger and more significant for the scenario allowing haying and/or grazing th
the one not allowing it.   FARMINC and MRKTVAL are both negative and significant at the 2.5
percent and 0.5 percent significance levels, respectively.  EROSION is negative and is significant 
(2.5 percent) only for the haying and/or grazing allowed scenario.  Of the regional dummy 
variables, the negative coefficient on CORNBELT is the largest and most significant.  This i
unexpected given the productivity of the cropland in the Corn Belt and the value of commodity 
program corn base.  The coefficient on RETIRED is particularly interesting.  For the scenario 
with no haying and/or grazing allowed, the coefficient is positive and significant, which is sensibl
as one would expect that the retired farmer would desire to extend the contract.  For the scenario 
with haying and/or grazing allowed, the coefficient is negative and significant, which is a sensible 
result as one would expect the retired farmer would prefer to receive a higher rental payment and 
not be able to work the land than to receive a lower rental payment but have the option of working 
the land.  The grand means listed at the bottom of the table are the γ's from the RUM, and are 
calculated by taking the sum of the products of the variable coefficients and means (excepting 
RPAY). 
 
In
and μ1 = ΔV* = γ + αRPR for RPR yields the lower and upper value limits of the rentall offer 
interval over which the farmers are indifferent to extending the CRP contract.  For the extensio
option with no haying or grazing allowed, this interval is $48.80 per acre to $60.20 per acre per 
year.vi  For the extension scenario with haying and/or grazing allowed, this interval is $41.15 pe
acre to $63.48 per acre per year.vii  The point where F[Y = 0] = F[Y = 2] occurs at $54.50 for the 
first scenario and $52.32 for the second.  The indifference interval for the latter scenario is 
approximately $10 wider than for the former.  While these two mid-points are quite similar,
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or the regressions with the "don't knows" removed, the mean minimum rental payments are 
hat 
hich 
   
. Forecasts of CRP enrollment extensions. 
dule of the CRP acres extended as a function of the 
fer, 
 
igures 3 (scenario 1) and 4 (scenario 2) present these simulation results with the total CRP acres 
increase in the interval width suggests that the level of indecision increases as new (untested) 
options are added to an existing good.   
 
F
almost identical at $54.79 and $54.72 per acre per year for scenarios 1 and 2, respectively.   W
these dichotomous results do not convey is that while the central tendencies may be similar 
between the two scenarios, in reality (as defined by the ordered probit results) the point at w
there is a 50% chance of nonrenewal is over $7 per acre lower for scenario 2 than for scenario 1. 
 
V
The major use of our model is to estimate a sche
rental price.  To do this, the coefficients from the ordered probit regression in Table 3 were used 
to calculate the probability of a "yes" response (i.e., Prob[yi = 2]) to some rental offer $X for each 
of the N farmers in the regression sample.  Next, for each observation i = 1,...,N, using a Bernoulli 
distribution with parameter Pi, a 0 (no) or 1 (yes) response is generated. If the predicted response is 
a 1, then the farmer's current CRP acreage is extended.  The re-enrolled acreage at rental offer $X 
are summed across all the farmers to get the total acreage re-enrollment at that rental offer.  The 
$X rental offers were chosen in ten dollar increments from $0 to $130 per acre.  In order to 
increase the simulation precision, this procedure was carried through 25 times for each bid of
with the final acreage enrolled predictions taken as the average of the 25 simulations.viii  A similar
procedure was used to find the number of acres associated with "don't know" responses to the $X 
rental offer as well as to find the number of acres extended based on the univariate probit 
regressions.   
 
F
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RP 
I. Conclusions 
licy makers some indication of how many CRP acres might be renewed under 
RP 
omparison of acreage re-enrollment projections based on our ordered response model, which 
ich 
e 
y of 
 
extended converted into percent of total current CRP acres.  In both figures, the univariate probit 
based results predict higher (up to 10% higher in scenario 2) percents of total contract acres 
extended than the ordered probit based results.   Each table also charts the percent of total C
acres associated with indifferent farmers.   
 
V
Our results give po
the contract extension intentions recently announced by the Secretary of Agriculture.  The 
simulations based on the ordered probit model results show that up to 50 percent of current C
acreage can be renewed at less than the current average CRP cost of $50 per acre.  On the other 
hand, as our results show, achieving near 100 percent contract renewal will be expensive.   
 
C
allows for farmer indifference to re-enrolling at the offered rental rate, versus the traditional 
dichotomous choice response model suggests that modelling farmer response using the latter 
model provides inadequate information.  Although both models find that the rental rate at wh
the probability of acceptance is equal to the probability of rejection is similar for the two CRP 
contract renewal scenarios, the dichotomous choice model cannot reveal that the rental rate rang
over which the farmer may be indifferent between renewing or not renewing the contract is 
different for the two scenarios.  While the dollar rental rates per acre at which the probabilit
nonrenewal equals the probability of renewal are close for the two scenarios at $54.50 for the first
scenario and $52.32 for the second scenario, the indifference interval around the latter value is $10 
wider than around the former.  The policy implications of wider indifference ranges is that small 
changes in farmer attitudes towards reenrollment in CRP may lead to relatively larger shifts in the 
probability of reenrollment at a given bid offer.  
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Appen Variables and their Sourcesix 
S 
 
ivestock and total acres owned and/or operated. 
0 = 
ments. 
WCS 
AENRO  participant’s identified CRP contract.  Source: USDA 
 
SDA 
ted 
by USDA’s Natural Resource Conservation Service, divided by AENROLL. 
RPAY = Rental payment offered to extend CRP contract ($/acre/year).  Source: SWCS survey 
and USDA CRP contract records.  Note: Product of payment percentage specified in 
survey and rental payment for existing CRP contract based on USDA records. 
TREES = Acres of trees in CRP contract.  Source: USDA CRP contract records  
MOUNT = 1 if CRP acres are located in the Mountain, Northern Plains, or Southern Plains USDA 
regions; 0 otherwise.  Source: USDA CRP contract records.  Note: Regional dummy 
variable. 
dix. Description of the Explanatory 
LSTOCK = Acres of Non-CRP land used by CRP participant for livestock.  Source: SWC
survey.  Note: Based on participant’s answer to  survey questions 33 and 34 that asked
percentage of acres used for l
RETIRED = Does CRP participant consider himself or herself retired from farming (1 = yes, 
no).  Source: SWCS survey.  Note: Based on participant’s answer to  survey question 
37. 
FARMINC = CRP participant’s 1992 gross income from all farming sources.  Source: SWCS 
survey.  Note: Based on participant’s answer to  survey question 38.  Includes 
government commodity and conservation program pay
MRKTVAL = Market value of local cropland similar to participant’s CRP land.  Source: S
survey.  Note: Based on participant’s answer to survey question 43. 
LL = Number of acres covered by
CRP contract records.  Note: CRP participants may have more than one contract.  
Consequently Survey identified a specific contract for consideration.
EROSION = Erosion rate on CRP land prior to its enrollment (tons/acre/year).  Source: U
CRP contract records.  Note: Total water-caused and wind-caused soil erosion, estima
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USDA regions; 0 
CORN
dummy 
 
DELTA = 1 if CRP acres are located in the Delta, Southeast, or Appalachian 
otherwise.  Source: USDA CRP contract records.  Note: Regional dummy variable. 
BELT = 1 if CRP acres are located in the Corn Belt, Lake States, or Northeast USDA 
regions; 0 otherwise. Source: USDA CRP contract records.  Note: Regional 
variable. 
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i.  In C rate 
ool.  
GAO f an 
prevailing local rental rates.  If the producer's rent request was less than or equal to the bid pool 
ontract.  After the first few signups, 
producers learned the MARRs, and many submitted rental rate requests equal to the MARR even 
though their land would have rented for less on the cash rental market. 
ii.  MacKenzie (1993) presents a similar discussion in the context of contingent rating and rankings.  
iii.  Since all farmers questioned are current holders of CRP contracts, their level of comprehension 
of these scenarios is very high, especially for the first one, which is a simple continuation of their 
current contract.  Since the farmers have minimal confusion about the good whose value is being 
elicited, the major source of indecision should be the percent value posted in the question, and the 
response "Don't Know" should be equivalent to other potential choices such as "Indifferent" or 
"Undecided".  Of these choices, "Don't Know" was chosen as a response choice based on its 
simplicity.  On the other hand, for a researcher seeking to use this ordered approach to value a 
hypothetical good (that may not be well understood by the respondent),  additional questioning is 
needed to separate responses which are undecided due to price from responses which are undecided 
due to confusion regarding the definition of the good.  
iv.  The bid pairs for the first (second) scenarios are 35 (20), 55 (40), 70 (55), 80 (65), 90 (75), 100 
(85), 115 (100), and 135 (120) percent.   
v.  Econometric results of the responses regressed directly on the percent values are available from 
the authors. 
  
Endnotes  
RP signups 1-9 (Mar. 1986-Aug. 1989), county ASC committees compared rental 
requests made by producers to a single maximum acceptable rental rate (MARR) for a bid p
ound that in some parts of the country, MARR's were set 200 to 300 percent higher th
MARR, the county committee was authorized to accept the c
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vi.  Note the current average rental rate for the farmers in this regression data set is $56.86 per acre 
per year. 
viii.  Because of the high level of significance of the regressions, 25 repeat simulations was more 
  
vii.  The standard error on the $48.80 is $0.52 using the Krinsky and Robb approach (1986) and 
$0.51 for both a second order Taylor series expansion approach (Shonkwiler and Maddala, 1994) and 
an approach described by Cameron (1991).  The standard error for scenario 2's $41.15 is $0.67 and 
$0.66, respectively. 
than adequate to find the central tendencies. 
ix.  The survey instrument is available upon request from the authors. 
